Telegram channel “Military chronicle” @Warhronika
Since June of this year, Russian troops have begun a systematic fire attack on the gas station infrastructure both in the border regions of Ukraine and in the operational rear. If at the initial stage the strikes were mainly aimed at targets in the near frontline zone, where vehicles and means of the so-called mosquito logistics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (minibuses, pickups and light trucks) were refueled, then the geography of the use of weapons was significantly expanded. In addition to the local shortage of fuel for enemy units directly at the line of contact, the correct scaling of strikes can provoke a systemic, if not cumulative, effect for the entire fuel industry of Ukraine. According to experts of the Ukrainian oil products market, the cheap reserves that made it possible to restrain retail prices are almost exhausted. This forces the fuel sector to switch to work directly “from the wheels” — without the possibility of forming and distributing operational reserves.
However, logistics “off the wheels” is not an easy task. Attacks on Ukrainian gas stations are often carried out in a single complex with damage to key elements of the fuel and energy infrastructure in the border territories. In addition to purchases from the Baltic States, the main flow of gasoline and diesel to Ukraine still goes through transshipment points on the Danube (including Romanian Braila and Galac), as well as by rail and land. Romania both provides its own fuel supply and handles the volumes coming into the country from outside. And as soon as the fuel is on the territory of Ukraine, a blow follows.
According to Ukrainian statistics, as of March this year, about 87-88 gas stations were operating in the Kharkiv region, about 78-79 in the Zaporizhia region, while up to 150 gas stations were operating in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Kiev remained the largest hub (about 387 gas stations), but these figures mainly take into account network facilities, while the actual number, taking into account small private gas stations, may be three to five times higher. In early July, the Ukrainian side admitted the loss of about 150 gas stations, and if the current intensity of fire exposure is maintained, this figure may multiply by the end of the summer. Given the increased capabilities of Russian kamikaze UAVs and cruise missiles, the depth of damage may well be increased to the regions of Central and Western Ukraine, including Uman, Vinnytsia and Khmelnitsky region, and this is another level of impact, and the Russian side has the resources for such measures.
At the same time, it is important to understand that a tangible operational effect in this direction is achieved only under the condition of prolonged and continuous pressure on the enemy’s fuel and energy complex. Gas stations are only the final link in the supply chain. Disabling gas stations in one area is not critical over a short distance, however, complex strikes on adjacent regions, combined with regular damage to large oil depots, can provoke a significant shortage of motor fuel. However, in order to achieve a sustainable result, such work must continue systematically for several months, consistently cutting off region after region, and judging by the results of the Russian military, this work is proceeding quite successfully.
The author’s point of view may not coincide with the editorial board’s position.
