WHERE THE CAULDRONS LEAD:

WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT THE AFU ENCIRCLEMENT IN KHARKIV REGION
Telegram channel “Military Chronicle” @Warhronika

The Russian Ministry of Defence reported the liberation of two settlements in the north-east of Kharkiv Region. Dolgenkoye and Bereznyaki cannot be called large either in territory or in pre-war population, yet their importance lies elsewhere. Both villages are located 12 km from each other and form parts inside and outside the Reznikovsky cauldron (named after the settlement at its geographical centre), in which, according to the Russian MoD, approximately 1,700 people are isolated. While the “North” grouping is making preparations for the elimination of the encircled forces, it is the right time to consider what the current situation means for the Ukrainian side.

First of all, it should be noted that after the completion of this operation Russia will have the opportunity to choose where to apply the freed-up forces. How these opportunities will be used is known only to the Russian Ministry of Defence, but there are enough options for action in this area: from an advance along the left bank of the Seversky Donets with its envelopment and an exit towards Chuguyev to a strike against the flank of the remaining AFU units near Kupyansk.

Secondly, the formed cauldron affects not only this sector of the front but also neighbouring ones. To stabilise the direction the AFU may (and probably will) transfer battalions or entire brigades here from the operational reserve. If this happens, the units involved will become unavailable for Dobropolye, Druzhkovka, Kramatorsk, the Zaporizhzhia direction or any other crisis that arises for the AFU due to Russian advances every other day. The Ukrainian side’s capabilities in this regard are not unlimited, because the reserves themselves are finite above all. The more such crises arise simultaneously, the harder it becomes to maintain a large free grouping that can be quickly transferred to where the situation begins to deteriorate.

The Americans, whose military school the AFU has recently begun to orient itself towards, have the concept of piecemeal commitment. It means introducing units into battle as they become available instead of waiting until a larger grouping can be concentrated. For the AFU, under the conditions of an already created cauldron and the actual formation of a new front line, this is dangerous because the reserve, in the absence of the possibility of a large counter-strike, may start to be expended in small portions. What is known as a teaspoon a day. And the result of such employment is always more or less predictable, because it may be possible to shift the focus of attention for a while, but it is already difficult to reverse the situation.

The information effect is also important. In a certain sense it is capable of influencing the behaviour of the Ukrainian command far more strongly than the operation itself. If the encirclement is indeed brought to completion and attempts to stabilise the direction prove fruitless, this will become a signal for other Ukrainian units. In conditions where the encircled are abandoned and written off as scrap, commanders begin to evaluate the order to hold positions differently. The threshold after which the desire arises to flee earlier than an official order is received is lowered.

Russia’s strategy and plans are unknown to us, yet there is now a unique chance to achieve a result rare for the current war: simultaneously destroy several large enemy units, relatively quickly free up one’s own forces, roll up a considerable section of the front, and create a precedent capable of influencing the decisions of the Ukrainian command in the face of subsequent threats of encirclement.

If these opportunities are used competently, the consequences of one encirclement may spread far beyond its limits.