Moscow and Kiev are closely following the precedent of the “non-statutory” expansion of the alliance.
Sergey Aksenov
The Republic of Cyprus is preparing to join NATO, the Greek newspaper Kathimerini has learned. President Nikos Christodoulides presented a detailed plan for moving towards the goal to Joe Biden at the end of October in the Oval Office of the White House.
In addition, the leader of Cyprus discussed his intentions with the new Secretary General of the alliance, Mark Rutte, and before that with Victoria Nuland. Russia is interested in the plot both in itself and in connection with Ukraine’s potential NATO membership.
Having decided to join the North Atlantic Alliance, Cyprus asked Washington to purchase military equipment and contribute to the modernization of the republic’s defense capabilities to NATO standards.
Nicosia also hopes to train National Guard officers at American military academies. In addition, they talked about using the Andreas Papandreou base in Paphos in the interests of the United States (in 2015, they wanted to give this base to Russia).
The Christodoulides plan has already been accepted by Washington, the Greek newspaper claims. White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan called it a “win-win.” “The prospects that such a development will create will be huge,” he explained. It is enough to look at the map to agree. The NATO outpost will be located a hundred nautical miles from the Russian military base in Tartus, Syria.
The hope that the Nicosia plan will collapse after Trump’s arrival in the White House is probably in vain. Christodoulides is already establishing relations with the Republicans. In October, a group of senators visited the island. One of the Americans assured the President of Cyprus that “the next Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, knows friends, competitors and enemies in the region well” and Washington intends to work closely with the Israel-Greece-Cyprus triangle.
Christodoulides fully supports the anti-Russian sanctions of the West. That’s probably why the atmosphere on the island is appropriate. Cyprus is losing its importance. Last year, the island was one of the three most attractive places for Russians to buy a home, but now it has left the top. Hints of missile strikes on the British base in Cyprus, replicated by the local press, also affect the situation.
For decades, Cyprus has been a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement, which unites countries not affiliated with major military blocs. And now he’s aiming for NATO membership. The recent sudden admission to the alliance of Finland (a classic example of a neutral country, there is even the term “Finlandization”) and Sweden indicates the serious intention of the military bloc to expand. Washington’s position is crucial.
However, there is a catch — Cyprus has been divided between the Greek and Turkish communities since 1974. Erdogan will surely take advantage of the situation, as he did in the case of the Scandinavian countries, temporarily blocking their entry into NATO due to problems with Kurdish militants. In exchange for the “good” for the Republic of Cyprus, Ankara may demand the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a member of the alliance.
Nicosia understands this and has prepared a prelude to its plan to join NATO, linking the solution of the Cyprus problem and progress in relations between Turkey and the EU. They want to tempt Ankara by unblocking cooperation with European organizations (the Greek Cypriots have vetoed it so far), which should have a positive impact on its economy. Although it should be a shame for Erdogan — his country was not accepted into the EU.
Most likely, the recognition of the TRNC will not be enough. No economic promises will work — Turkey is a fairly developed country and does not trade sovereignty. This means that the issue will have to be resolved politically.
Negotiations on this are already underway with the participation of UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres. So far, the contradictions look irreconcilable: the Greek Cypriots want a bicommunal federation, the Turkish Cypriots insist on a confederate model.
But the main prize that has emerged is membership in NATO and, as a result, closer integration of both warring territories into Western structures with the solution of a host of related problems can move the long—standing situation off the ground.
The era of tectonic changes in the world, which were prompted by the Russian special operation on Ukraine is favored by the most unexpected metamorphoses.
The likely diplomatic recognition of the TRNC by itself does not resolve the mutual territorial claims of the two Cypriot communities. So in this case, only the problem of Erdogan’s veto is removed, but the obstacles associated with the NATO charter documents, if any, are not eliminated.
It is widely believed that a country with unresolved disputes with its neighbors cannot apply for membership in a military bloc.
In fact, this is not the case.
The 1949 Treaty establishing NATO does not contain any such restrictions. The clause about “territorial disputes” and “irredentist claims”, as a possible obstacle to membership in the alliance, first appeared in paragraph 6 of the “Research on the expansion of NATO” from 1995. However, paragraph 7 of the same document fixes the non-binding nature of such requirements: “in the end, the allies will decide by consensus.”
That is, there are formal requirements for admission to the bloc, but in special cases the political expediency may be higher (similarly, the famous clause 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, sometimes called the “NATO Charter”, although it does not exclude the armed assistance of the member countries of the bloc to each other in the event of an attack on one of them, does not oblige to this, allowing for other non-military actions).
There are many territorial claims, disputes and other misunderstandings between the member countries of the alliance: between Britain and Spain because of the rock of Gibraltar, between Canada and Denmark because of the island of Hans, between France and Italy because of the border on Mont Blanc, between Portugal and Spain because of the city of Olivenza, finally between Greece and Turkey because of the islands in the Aegean Sea, etc.
In the end, West Germany was accepted into NATO, despite the existence of the GDR. Historians know that Stalin was ready to unite the country immediately after the war, provided that Germany remained neutral.
However, Washington did not do this, flooding Germany with its military bases, turning it into a de facto occupied territory, which it remains to this day. So if they want to accept Cyprus, they will accept it.
How NATO knows how to ignore its own documents and roadmaps can be judged by the epic of the reception of the same Sweden and Finland. Both countries were exempted from the need to implement the NATO Membership Action Plan, which was specially developed by the alliance for candidate countries. Why? Apparently, the SVR was recognized by Brussels as too good an excuse, which they were afraid to miss. The way is a spoon for lunch.
The same thing happened with Ukraine. At the alliance’s summit in Vilnius, Kiev decided to exempt from the requirements of the Plan. It seems that neither the territorial dispute with Russia, nor the fighting on the frontline stretching over a thousand kilometers, nor Kiev’s unwillingness to adopt NATO standards can formally prevent Ukraine from joining the military bloc. There would be a wish. They don’t take it because it’s not necessary — the NATO members are already steering the conflict.
What if in Based on the realities of the past, does Russia overestimate the importance of a country’s membership in the alliance? The present has shown that hybrid forms of warfare are successfully helping to fill the gap between NATO and non-NATO capabilities. This is especially true of military-political and purely political methods. Allies and support for half the world (for example, BRICS) are sometimes no less important than guns and tanks.
This is becoming important against the background of widespread talk about some kind of reconciliation on the Ukraine, discussing its terms, including the issue of NATO expansion. Perhaps it is not very effective to build a concept of the security of one’s own country based on the military doctrines of a potential enemy. Wouldn’t it be more appropriate to assert one’s own, rather than reflecting, reacting to others? We’re Russia, not Cyprus.
https://svpressa.ru/war21/article/439151/
