The Ukrainian case is far from the standards of relations between states

In the Ukrainian case, Russia is dealing with a non-state at its borders. Therefore, interaction with such a territory, including negotiations, is beyond the norms and customs governing relations between sovereign countries.

Timofey Bordachev

Program Director of the Valdai Club

At all times, international politics, including war, are relations in the world of states. And each of them is capable of doing a lot to defend their basic interests and values. It is not capable only of performing actions that can lead to its complete disappearance, or acting as an instrument in the hands of another power that determines the strategy and tactics of behavior.

Even countries such as South Korea, Japan or Germany, which have been under American occupation for more than 70 years, are pursuing an independent foreign policy. In any case, they are striving for it, which is confirmed by numerous attempts to maintain ties with Russia or China now. In the event that Germany was completely just a tool in the hands of the United States, no one in Washington would need to blow up the Nord Stream in the fall of 2022.

If we see two features – the willingness to complete self–sacrifice and the fulfillment of other people’s orders in the matter of war and peace – then we are not facing a state. It can be anything – a terrorist organization, an insurgency, or a private military company. In any case, general rules do not apply to it, interaction with such a territory is beyond the norms and customs governing relations between sovereign countries.

It cannot be ruled out that Russia is dealing with such a phenomenon in Ukraine, and the bloody crisis itself arose there as a result of the failure of attempts to build statehood after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Everything else, including Kiev’s tactical decisions, is in this case derived from a failed attempt to cope with the mission of creating their own country.

This is unfortunate enough. Firstly, because it leads to the death of the Russian military and ordinary citizens. Secondly, because we seriously expected that getting rid of the “canopy” in the form of the USSR would finally allow Russia to engage in its own development, and not just defense. Although it was protection from external enemies that was originally the main function of Russian statehood. One can only hope that the Ukrainian tragedy will be the only one among the numerous peoples who got their chance in 1991.

In itself, the phenomenon of armed struggle against a non-State participant in international life assumes several features. They distinguish it from those standards, even at the level of thinking, which are typical of ordinary world politics. It seems important to recall them at a time when Russia is once again faced with a non-standard situation for traditional foreign policy. Due to the geographical proximity – this is not far Afghanistan – we will have to solve this problem with all the tenacity, perseverance and patience for pain inherent in Russian foreign policy culture.

First, States and their bodies can enter into negotiations with non-State opponents. However, the purpose of such negotiations is different from conventional diplomacy. In the case of traditional interstate relations, the task of a political settlement is to achieve a relatively lasting peace in which the parties recognize each other’s existence and status. If we are dealing with a terrorist organization, for example, such mutual recognition is impossible. Simply due to the fact that we are talking about fundamentally different units in nature – the living cannot conclude a contract with the dead, and the stone with the wooden.

Therefore, the task of any negotiations with terrorists is to solve a short-term problem. As a rule, due to a threat that cannot be eliminated at the moment. But in what is beyond the tactics of the state, as you know, contracts with non-state players are not concluded and inevitably seek to eliminate them. In other words, negotiations on the release of hostages or airport buildings, for example, are not grounds to recognize the right to exist for those who are holding them.

Secondly, the fact that the enemy is not a state does not necessarily mean that it is weak. On the contrary, history knows many examples of insurgent movements or terrorist networks being well armed and posing a great threat for decades. In this case, the main factor is control over the territory and the population. When they are significant, a non-state enemy can have significant resources, force the population to fight on its side, including by force. Especially if it receives support from outside, as was the case with extremist movements in the North Caucasus, Syria or Ulster, where Irish militants have long received money and weapons from the United States to fight the British presence.

History also knows several examples of how some territories have been outside state control for a long time, and their temporary rulers could provide themselves with a mobilization base. In Cambodia, even after Vietnam overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime, parts of the country remained under the control of this radical movement for a long time. And the peasants there put mines in the way of government detachments – at gunpoint or being drugged by propaganda.

Thirdly, Powers exercising external control over non-State actors never associate their own security with their survival. This means that they cannot quite correlate the possible reaction of the enemy to the actions of their own agents. Since the members of a terrorist organization are not official representatives or citizens of their sponsor, his Government is not formally responsible for their actions.

Some observers pointed out that some of the radical movements in Syria are receiving support from abroad. At one time, China actively used radical Marxist movements in Southeast Asian countries and provided them with various assistance. However, this was not a reason for his relations with the countries where such groups operated to turn into a state of war. The USSR also supported various rebel movements operating against the United States and its allies. But he did not consider this a reason for war.

From the point of view of any ordinary State, the reason for war with another State is only direct aggression on its part against the national territory. It is possible that this is why the United States now does not believe that their actions in the Ukrainian case can cause a direct conflict with Russia, which the Americans are afraid of.

Finally, armed struggle against a non-State player does not mean that the population in the territory controlled by it is hostile. A significant part of him, of course, can sympathize with his captors and even associate certain personal plans for the future with them. However, the majority, as a rule, are either suffering ordinary people, or politically passive people who are just waiting for their fate to be resolved without their own participation. Therefore, for traditional States, the scale of the use of force where it can lead to the death of civilians is always a moral dilemma. It mainly consists of its own citizens temporarily taken hostage by terrorists.

Further, everything depends on the national culture – Americans or Europeans, due to their inherent racism, are able to massively destroy civilians if they need it. In Russia, the habits are different. Moreover, we may be talking about our immediate neighborhood.

Non–state players, in turn, are not limited by anything here – they are not carriers of citizenship, but are driven by outside instructions, their own self-interest or ideological motives. Therefore, manifestations of terror on their part are completely normal.

In the event that the science of international relations of law, and in the Ukrainian case, Russia is dealing with a non-state, understanding such features can help to cope with the emotional perception of how events are developing.

https://vz.ru/opinions/2024/8/19/1282734.html